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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TAX INFORMATION EXCHANGE IMPACT ON FDI: TAX HAVENS
CASE STUDY

JAN ROHAN* AND LUKÁŠ MORAVEC**
INTRODUCTION
Harmful Tax Competition, issued by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) in 1998, defines the basic criteria for
identifying tax havens. 1 The criteria are described in the following manner: taxfree or only nominal taxes, the lack of effective exchange of information, lack
of transparency, and insubstantial activities. 2 In 2000, the Global Forum on
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (a forum created
by the OECD) prepared a list of uncooperative jurisdictions (“tax havens”). 3 In
order to remove themselves from this black list, the jurisdictions only had one
choice: sign at least twelve Tax Information Exchange Agreements (“TIEAs”)
or Double Taxation Agreements (“DTAs”) with a provision on the exchange of
information in tax matters. 4

* Jan Rohan is a Ph.D. student at the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague. His research is
focused on the tax havens and the tax planning issue. He works for the General Financial
Directorate of the Czech Republic where he is responsible for the administrative cooperation in tax
matters and the international exchange of tax information.
** Lukáš Moravec is a tax tutor at the Czech University of Life Sciences Prague, Bohemia and a
lector at the College of European and Regional Studies in Ceske Budejovice, Bohemia particularly.
His research work aims at the tax competition and the tax havens’ role on one side and, on the other
side, he participates in the indirect taxes fraud risk analysis development.
1. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 22–23 (1998); see also Jan Rohan & Lukáš Moravec, Tax Information
Exchange Influence on Czech Based Companies’ Behavior in Relation to Tax Havens, 65 ACTA
UNIVERSITATIS AGRICULTURAE ET SILVICULTURAE MENDELIANAE BRUNENSIS 721, 721 (2017)
(Czech).
2. OECD, supra note 1, at 23; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721.
3. OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL
COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS 12, 17
(2000); see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721.
4. See OECD CENTRE FOR TAX POLICY AND ADMIN., COUNTERING OFFSHORE TAX
EVASION: SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 10–11 (2009), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/harmful/424
69606.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN88-H62F]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721.
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The OECD is not the only institution that has tried to define tax havens. For
example, the U.S. Congress, 5 Lowtax Network, 6 Tax Justice Network, 7 and the
International Monetary Fund 8 have issued lists of jurisdictions with preferential
tax regimes.
There are also many authors that have studied jurisdictions with preferential
tax regimes. For example, Kerzner’s research and Addison’s research deals with
the effect of TIEAs. 9 According to Addison’s 2009 study, TIEAs provide
deficient measures to fight tax havens. 10 According to his results, the non-tax
haven jurisdiction should vigorously pursue “domestic policies targeting tax
havens” because unilateral action is easier to enforce. 11
Braun and Weichenrieder’s research, as well as our previous research,
focuses on the effect of tax information exchange measures on taxpayers’ redomiciliation (i.e., whether the moment of TIEAs’ and DTAs’ conclusion with
the offshore jurisdiction is associated with numbers of relocated companies to
other jurisdictions in order to keep anonymity of their beneficial owners). 12
Braun and Weichenrieder focus on German multinational companies. 13 Our
previous research confirms Braun and Weichenrieder’s theory that firms invest

5. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act of 2007, S. 681, 110th Cong. § 101(b) (2007) (creating an
initial list of “offshore secrecy jurisdictions,” consisting of jurisdictions “which have been
previously and publicly identified by the Internal Revenue Service as secrecy jurisdictions in
Federal court proceedings”).
6. Headline Taxes Rates Around the World, LOWTAX.NET, https://www.lowtax.net/tax-rates/
[https://perma.cc/JBN7-Q4DS]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721. To learn more
about Lowtax and their network of tax information websites, see About Lowtax, LOWTAX.NET,
https://www.lowtax.net/about.html [https://perma.cc/5TC7-SGT4].
7. TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, TAX US IF YOU CAN 36–37 (2005).
8. Monetary Exchange Affairs Dep’t, Offshore Financial Centers, INT’L MONETARY FUND
(June 23, 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/oshore/2000/eng/back.htm [https://perma.
cc/S6D8-3R5R]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721.
9. See DAVID S. KERZNER & DAVID W. CHODIKOFF, The OECD’s War on Offshore Tax
Evasion 1996-2014, in INTERNATIONAL TAX EVASION IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE 53
(2016) (discussing the effects of TIEAs in the United States and Canada); Timothy V. Addison,
Shooting Blanks: The War on Tax Havens, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 703 (2009) (discussing
the effects of the TIEAs that the United States has entered into with states considered to be tax
havens).
10. Addison, supra note 9, at 718 (“TIEAs will continue to be ineffective if the United States
and other OECD member states do not enact more effective legislation to combat tax evasion and
provide adequate incentives for tax havens to seek out tax evaders.”); see also Rohan & Moravec,
supra note 1, at 721.
11. Addison, supra note 9, at 720–21; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 721.
12. See JULIA BRAUN & ALFONS WEICHENRIEDER, DOES EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
BETWEEN TAX AUTHORITIES INFLUENCE MULTINATIONALS’ USE OF TAX HAVENS? (Centre for
Eur. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 15-015, Feb. 23, 2015) (examining how the conclusion
of these agreements affects the investment of German multinational enterprises in tax havens).
13. Id. at 1–2.
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in tax havens not only for low tax rates but also for the secrecy that these
jurisdictions offer. 14
Cobham, Janský, and Meinzer deal with another perception of anonymity
that tax havens offer. 15 They have developed the Financial Secrecy Index
(“FSI”), which evaluates jurisdictions pursuant “to their contribution to opacity
in global financial flow.” 16 Zucman focuses on the impact of TIEAs on bank
deposits in uncooperative jurisdictions. 17 Ligthart and Voget’s 2008 study is
aimed at empirical determinants relating to income tax information exchange
between the Netherlands and other countries. 18
The effect of tax information exchange measures on portfolio investment in
preferential tax jurisdictions is discussed by Hanlon’s 2015 study. 19 There are a
number of papers analyzing the TIEAs’ and DTAs’ effects on foreign direct
investments, for example, Blonigen and Davies, 20 Baker, 21 Coupé, Orlova, and
Skiba, 22 and Blonigen, Oldenski, and Sly. 23 These authors provide more specific
evidence that implies DTAs and TIEAs may decrease or have no effect on the
overall value of foreign direct investments in contracted countries. 24 It might be

14. Id. at 26; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722.
15. See Alex Cobham, Petr Janský & Markus Meinzer, The Financial Secrecy Index: Shedding
New Light on the Geography of Secrecy, 91 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 281 (2015) (discussing the
incentive of financial secrecy in offshore tax jurisdictions).
16. Id. at 294–95; Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722.
17. See Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate
Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 144–45 (2014) (discussing effect of agreements to share banking
information); see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722.
18. Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722. See generally JENNY E. LIGTHART & JOHANNES
VOGET, THE DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-BOARDER TAX INFORMATION SHARING: A PANEL DATA
ANALYSIS (2008), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.507.4779&rep=rep1
&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/42KR-8CGV].
19. See Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew & Jacob R. Thornock, Taking the Long Way
Home: U.S. Tax Evasion and Offshore Investments in U.S. Equity and Debt Markets, 70 J. FIN. 257
(2015) (reaching the conclusion that “engaging in information-sharing agreements with tax havens
decreases inbound portfolio investment from those havens”).
20. Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI
Activity, 11 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 601 (2004) (Neth.).
21. Paul L. Baker, An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and Their Effect on Foreign Direct
Investment, 21 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 341 (2014).
22. Tom Coupé, Irina Orlova & Alexandre Skiba, The Effect of Tax and Investment Treaties
on Bilateral FDI Flows to Transition Economies, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND
INVESTMENT FLOWS 687 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
23. Bruce A. Blonigen, Lindsay Oldenski & Nicholas Sly, The Differential Effects of Bilateral
Tax Treaties, 6 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1 (2014).
24. Baker, supra note 21, at 362 (concluding that these agreements have no effect on foreign
direct investment); Blonigen & Davies, supra note 20, at 616 (concluding that these agreements
“substantially reduce tax evasion practices which were a significant motivation for [foreign direct
investment]”); Blonigen et al., supra note 23, at 17 (concluding that “there is no robust evidence of
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caused by multinational companies’ (“MNCs”) re-domiciliation in order to keep
their anonymity. On the other hand, the MNCs remaining in tax havens after the
conclusion of TIEAs/DTAs may increase their investments thanks to more
inviting tax conditions.
The aim of this Paper is to quantify the conclusive effects of tax information
exchange instruments on foreign direct investments allocated to the Czech
MNCs whose owners are from tax havens. This aim is based on Braun and
Weichenrieder’s 2015 hypothesis. The main research question is whether Czech
MNCs that remain in preferential tax jurisdictions after conclusion of the
agreements on exchange of information in collaboration with the Czech
Republic increase their foreign direct investments compared to non-contracted
jurisdictions. It means that Czech MNCs prefer favorable tax regimes instead of
anonymity.
I. MATERIALS AND METHODS
To begin, we have utilized a classification analysis to divide countries into
preferential and non-preferential tax jurisdictions. The tax havens’ selection has
been carried out on the basis of concluded and non-concluded TIEAs (and
DTAs). In the framework’s described analysis, it could be said that the Czech
Republic has concluded approximately eighty-five DTAs and eight TIEAs since
late 2014. 25
In order to determine the TIEAs’ and DTAs’ effect on foreign direct
investments allocated to tax havens, the Difference-in-Differences Method (difin-dif) is being applied. The analyzed data was obtained from the Ministry of
Finance of the Czech Republic and the Czech National Bank. 26 After the dif-indif method, the synthesis of findings was carried out in order to quantify and
explain the impact of TIEAs and DTAs.

an average positive effect” of these agreements on foreign direct investment); Coupé et al., supra
note 22, at 709 (concluding that “tax treaties do not reveal any robust effect on FDI flows”).
25. Int’l Tax Dep’t, Double Taxation: Overview of Valid Contracts, MINISTRY FIN. CZECH
(Jan.
25,
2017),
http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/legislativa/dvoji-zdaneni/prehled-platnych-smluv
[https://perma.cc/UN2L-WNXX]; see also Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 722.
26. MONETARY & STATISTICS DEP’T, CZECH NAT’L BANK, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
IN 2012, at § 4.2 (2014); STATISTICS & DATA SUPPORT DEP’T, CZECH NAT’L BANK, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN 2014, at §§ 3, 4 (2016).
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Jurisdiction

Entry into force

British Virgin Island
Jersey
Bermuda
Isle of Man
Guernsey
San Marino
Cayman Islands
Andorra

12. 19. 2012
03. 14. 2012
03. 14. 2012
05. 18. 2012
07. 09. 2012
09. 06. 2012
09. 20. 2013
06. 05. 2014
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Table 1: The list of concluded TIEAs with the Czech Republic as of the end of
2014 (Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic). 27
The categorical periods are 2012 (the period marked as “before” concluding
an agreement) and the third quarter of 2014 (the period marked as “after”
concluding an agreement). Jurisdictions are divided into two groups. The first
group, marked “Control,” includes foreign direct investments allocated to the
Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential jurisdictions without any DTA
or TIEA concluded with the Czech Republic (in the monitored periods). In the
second group, called “Treatment,” there are foreign direct investments allocated
to the Czech MNCs whose owners come from preferential tax jurisdictions that
the Czech Republic had not concluded any agreements for exchange of
information in the period “before.” However, in the period marked “after,” the
agreement with these jurisdictions was concluded by the Czech Republic.
A.

Model Description

The proposed model of the TIEAs’ and DTAs’ effect uses the following
equation and variables:
Yst = α * x0t + β * T + γ * S + δ * T * S + ust
Yst ..... is the outcome of interest (amount of foreign direct investments)
α ....................................................................................... is the constant
x0t ................................................................................. is the unit vector
β .............................................is the parameter of exogenous variable T
T ....................................................... is the time period dummy variable
γ.............................................. is the parameter of exogenous variable S

27. Int’l Tax & Customs Cooperation Dep’t, Double Taxation: Overview of TIEA Agreements,
MINISTRY FIN. CZECH (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/legislativa/mezinarodni-spolupracev-oblasti-dani/prehled-dohod-tiea [https://perma.cc/QA94-GBKH]; see also Rohan & Moravec,
supra note 1, at 722.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

198

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:193

S ................. is the dummy variable that captures possible differences
between the treatment and control groups (conclusion or not conclusion
of the agreement)
δ ...................................................................... is the parameter of T * S
T * S ........... is the product of the dummy variables for purpose to
capture the required effect
ust..................................................................................... is the residue 28
The variable “S” indicates the type of group. In the above model, there are
two groups, “Treatment” and “Control.” The variable “S” is binary, i.e. S ∈
{0,1}. 29 For the Control group, the variable “S” takes the value of zero. For the
Treatment group, the variable “S” takes the value of one. The variable “T”
denotes the time period, which is divided on pre-treatment period, i.e. the period
before agreement’s conclusion, and the post-treatment period, i.e. the period
after agreement’s conclusion. 30 “T” is also a binary variable. The main purpose
of this model is to discover the conclusive effect of switching “S” from zero to
one. 31 The variable “Yst” represents foreign direct investments allocated to the
Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential jurisdictions for a particular
value of “S” in period “T.” 32
The equation’s modification is needed in order to measure estimations. In
the equation there are numbers filled depending on the time period and group’s
type. Subsequently, the constant and the unit vector are added. Finally, the
equation can be estimated.
B.

Results

On the basis of the mentioned equation the following parameters have been
estimated:
α ....................................................................takes the value of 458.829
β .................................................................. takes the value of -203.547
γ.....................................................................takes the value of 493.614
δ ....................................................................takes the value of 458.580
In order to calculate the impact of TIEAs/DTAs, the parameters mentioned
above are put into the model. The mentioned values are denoted in millions of
Czech Crowns (“CZK”). For a better overview of the results, see Graph 1 below.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Graph 1: Dif-in-dif model in graphical view (authors’ own elaboration using the
Czech Ministry of Finance and the Czech National Bank data).

The Control line illustrates the Control group, which includes foreign direct
investments allocated to the Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential
tax jurisdictions that have no agreement for exchange of information with the
Czech Republic in period “T0” and “T1.” Given that, there is a decrease in the
amount of foreign direct investments by 55.6%, i.e., 458.829 million CZK to
255.282 million CZK.
Graph 1 depicts two other lines, Group A and Group B, that show the
Treatment group, but each line is based on different assumptions. Both lines at
period “T0” start at the same point—952.443 million CZK—due to nonconclusive TIEAs or DTAs. The Group B line at the period “T1” shows a
hypothetical situation without any change of foreign direct investments allocated
to the Czech MNCs despite the concluded DTAs or TIEAs.
This explains subsequent decreases from 952.443 million CZK in foreign
direct investments to 748.898 million CZK. As can be seen in Graph 1, the
Group B and Control lines are of equal measure because they depict the same
situation and there is the same increase by β (203.547 million CZK) between the
period “T0” and “T1.”
On the other side, the Group A line illustrates the real situation and the real
development. This line shows the amount of foreign direct investments allocated
to the Czech MNCs whose owners are from preferential tax jurisdictions that
had no agreement in the period “T0,” but in period “T1” the agreements have
concluded. Because of the DTA’s/TIEA’s conclusion there is an increase of the
amount of foreign direct investments from 952.443 million CZK to 1207.476
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million CZK. This increase cannot be considered as the final effect of concluded
agreements on exchange of information.
The final impact is quantified by comparing the Group A line with the Group
B line. The result is shown by δ. The final effect demonstrates that if there were
not any concluded TIEAs and DTAs the amount of foreign direct investments
would be 748.898 million CZK. After the conclusion of TIEAs or DTAs, the
amount of foreign direct investments increases to 1207.476 million CZK. The
result of conclusion of TIEAs/DTAs is a significant increase of foreign direct
investments by 61.2%.
For transactions that are carried out with non-contracted jurisdictions (i.e.,
jurisdictions that do not conclude instruments for exchange of information), the
Czech Republic applies a 35% rate withholding tax. 33 If there is a conclusion of
such instruments, the taxation of transactions is amended by specific provision
or the tax is withheld by a 15% rate. 34 These abovementioned results show that
Czech MNCs remaining in preferential tax jurisdictions after conclusion of
TIEAs/DTAs increase the amount of their foreign direct investments (i.e., they
prefer favorable tax regimes instead of anonymity).
II. DISCUSSION
Our findings are mostly in agreement with Braun and Weichenrieder’s
2015, 35 Baker’s 2014, 36 Coupé et al.’s 2009, 37 and Blonigen et al.’s 2014 38
results. However, they mentioned that TIEAs and DTAs have had either a
negative impact or no impact on foreign direct investments because of MNCs’
re-domiciliation from tax havens to another non-contracted jurisdiction after the
conclusion of tax information exchange instruments. 39 On the other hand, our
results prove that Czech MNCs remaining in preferential tax jurisdictions after
conclusion of TIEAs/DTAs increase an amount of their foreign direct
investments. The MNCs benefit from better tax conditions resulting from DTAs
or TIEAs. The opposite effects, compared to the authors above, could be caused
by differences in the national tax systems. For instance, the Czech Republic has

33. Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 36(1)(c) (Czech); see also Czech Republic:
Corporate Withholding Taxes, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (May 25, 2017), http://taxsumma
ries.pwc.com/ID/Czech-Republic-Corporate-Withholding-taxes [https://perma.cc/XG7Z-P95D]
(showing that countries with which the Czech Republic does not have an enforceable DTA or TIEA,
are subject to a 35% withholding tax).
34. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 33.
35. See BRAUN & WEICHENRIEDER, supra note 12, at 26.
36. See Baker, supra note 21, at 362.
37. See Coupé et al., supra note 22, at 709–10.
38. See Blonigen et al., supra note 23, at 17.
39. Baker, supra note 21, at 362; Blonigen et al., supra note 23, at 17; Coupé et al., supra note
22, at 709.
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a 35% rate withholding tax on transactions with non-contractual jurisdictions. 40
This tax should have the dissuasive effect to transfer funds into tax havens.
According to Braun and Weichenrieder’s 2015 research, 41 Krejčí’s 2016
research, 42 and our previous research, approximately 44% of MNCs, whose
owners are from preferential tax jurisdictions, are seated in tax havens for
anonymity protection reasons. 43 The rest of MNCs stay there for other reasons,
for example, tax planning. We do not agree with Addison’s 2009 study, which
claims that TIEAs are “symbolic” and provide insufficient additional
measures. 44 Our research and Braun and Weichenrieder’s 2015 results show the
opposite. 45 However, we agree with Addison and Kerzner that countries should
focus on their domestic law. 46 Countries have several options for improving their
national tax law. Many countries have inclined to the implementation of
particular BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) action plans, developed by
the OECD, as the best way to combat tax havens.
CONCLUSION
This Paper identifies the significant effect of tax information exchange on
foreign direct investments allocated to the Czech MNCs whose owners are from
preferential tax jurisdictions. The research proves that Czech MNCs, remaining
in tax havens after conclusion of DTAs/TIEAs, increased their foreign direct
investments. Foreign direct investments have increased approximately by 61.2%
after TIEAs’/DTAs’ conclusion. This situation can be explained as a benefit in
light of better tax conditions that DTAs offer for Czech MNCs, whose owners
are from contractual jurisdictions. On the other hand, there is a decrease of
55.6% in foreign direct investments at control group. It could be caused by the
35% withholding tax, which is applied by the Czech Republic on transactions
directly transferred to non-contracted jurisdictions 47 (i.e., jurisdictions that have
40. Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 36(1)(c) (Czech); see also
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 33.
41. BRAUN & WEICHENRIEDER, supra note 12, at 26.
42. Petr Krejčí, Senior Consultant, Bisnode, Presentation at the International Structures –
Adaption to Current Legislative Changes Conference (Apr. 24, 2016) (printed materials distributed
at Conference on file with author). For information about the Conference, please visit
https://www.akont.cz/nase-znalosti/seminare-prednasky-a-konference.html/84_2025-mezinarod
ni-struktury-%E2%80%93-adaptace-na-aktualni-legislativni-zmeny
[https://perma.cc/779T-87
FD].
43. Rohan & Moravec, supra note 1, at 724.
44. Addison, supra note 9, at 704.
45. BRAUN & WEICHENRIEDER, supra note 12, at 26.
46. KERZNER & CHODIKOFF, supra note 9, at 66–67 (suggesting that jurisdictions with bank
secrecy laws need legislation permitting greater access to bank information in order combat tax
evasion); Addison, supra note 9, at 720.
47. Income Tax Act, Act No. 586/1992, § 36(1)(c) (Czech); see also
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 31.
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not signed the instruments on exchange of information yet). These transactions
flow to non-contractual jurisdictions indirectly (i.e., through jurisdictions that
do not withhold tax). The offshore non-contractual jurisdictions are mainly used
for anonymity and financial secrecy. At a general level, taxpayers, who want to
keep their anonymity after DTAs’/TIEAs’ conclusion, are relocated to another
non-contractual jurisdiction. Those who do not prefer anonymity remain in
contractual jurisdictions and benefit from better tax conditions.
There is an opportunity for further case study focused on MNCs’ anonymity.
Thanks to an increased number of jurisdictions participating in the Convention
on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters and strengthening
automatic exchange of information, it will be more difficult to stay anonymous.
These instruments give the tax authorities new ways to obtain information like
beneficiary ownership, tax planning schemes, bank account information, etc.
The future research will be targeted on new measures used by MNCs to keep
their anonymity.

